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TO ALL PARTIES AND TO THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD HEREIN: 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Defendant GoDaddy.com, LLC ("Go Daddy"), will move 
this Court, the Honorable Buddie J. Hahn, 260th District Court, 801 W. Division Street, Orange, 
Texas 77630, on May 30, 2013 at 2:30 p.m., or as soon thereafter as counsel can be heard, for an 
order to amend and certifY the Court's April 17,2013 Order denying Go Daddy's motion to 
dismiss pursuant to Rule 168 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and Section SI.014(d) of the 
Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. 
Counsel for Go Daddy met and conferred with counsel for Plaintiffs on April 24, 2013 to 
determine whether Plaintiffs would consent or otherwise no oppose Go Daddy's motion. As of 
the filing of this motion, Plaintiffs' counsel had not yet advised of Plaintiffs' position with 
respect to this Motion. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Pursuant to Rule 168 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and Section Sl.OI4(d) of the 
Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, Defendant GoDaddy.com, LLC ("Go Daddy") submits 
this memorandum of points and authorities in support of its motion for certification of the 
Court's Order of April 17, 2013 (the "Order") for interlocutory review. As detailed below, the 
the Order meets the criteria for certification for immediate appeal. As a result, Go Daddy 
respectfully requests that the Court amend the Order to certify the following issues: (1) whether 
immunity under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (the "CDA") bars each of the 
claims asserted against Go Daddy as a matter of law and (2) whether Plaintiffs, as a matter of 
law, have alleged facts that, if true, state a claim against Go Daddy under Texas law. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Plaintiffs' Claims 
Plaintiffs' action is brought on behalf of a putative class of women who allege that the 
individual defendants published sexually explicit photographs of them without their permission 
on two websites, WWW.TEXXXAN.COM and WWW.TEXXXANS.COM. Plaintiffs admit 
that Go Daddy had no involvement in the creation, development, or publishing of the offending 
content at issue. See Am. Pet. ,m 11, 13; Second Am. Pet. '1(13. Rather, Plaintiffs allege only 
that Go Daddy provided Internet hosting services to the operator of the two websites. See id. 
Nonetheless, Plaintiffs claim that the provision of such Internet services constituted 
grossly negligent violations of the Texas Penal Code, intentional invasion of Plaintiffs' privacy, 
intentional disclosure of Plaintiffs' private facts, intentional intrusion of Plaintiffs' right of 
seclusion, wrongful appropriation of Plaintiffs' name and likeness, and intentional placement of 
Plaintiffs' in a false light. See J. Morgan Letter to Court dated 4/18/13 at'1(3. Plaintiffs also 
claim that by providing such hosting services, Go Daddy participated in a civil conspiracy with 
the operator of the websites and the individual defendants who allegedly created, developed, and 
published the offending material at issue. See id. 
B. Statutory Immuuity Under Section 230 ofthe CDA 
In 1996, Congress enacted Section 230 of the CDA to eliminate uncertainties in the law 
governing whether providers of interactive computer services, such as Go Daddy, could be liable 
for harms resulting from the dissemination of tortious or otherwise harmful content created or 
developed by users of those services or by other third parties. In passing Section 230, Congress 
made the policy decision to immunize interactive service providers from liability under state law 
for hann caused by the dissemination of third-party infonnation. 
Congress recognized that imposing liability on online intermediaries like Go Daddy for 
unlawful third-party content would threaten the development of the online industry as a medium 
for new forms of mass communication and would create disincentives to self-regulation of such 
content by responsible service providers. As a result, Congress determined that liability should 
rest with the actual wrongdoers-the originators of illegal and harmful content-and not 
intermediary services, like Go Daddy, whose systems are sometimes abused by such 
wrongdoers. 
C. Procedural History 
The Texas Supreme Court recently adopted changes to the Texas Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which permitted for the first time the filing of a motion to dismiss. See Tex. Rules of 
Civ. Proc. 91a. Rule 91a is modeled after Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
and became effective on March 1,2013. 
On March 8, 2013, Go Daddy filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' claims pursuant to 
Rule 91a. The crux of Go Daddy's motion was (1) that the immunity afforded Go Daddy as an 
Internet service provider under Section 230 of the CDA barred each of Plaintiffs' claims as a 
matter of law; and (2) even if Plaintiffs' claims were not barred, Plaintiffs nonetheless failed to 
assert facts that, if true, state a claim against Go Daddy. Plaintiffs filed an opposition to Go 
Daddy's motion on April 9, 2013; the Court heard oral argument on April 16,2013. On April 
17,2013, the Conrt denied Go Daddy's motion. No statement of decision has been issued. 
III. ARGUMENT 
On a party's motion or on its own initiative, a trial court in a civil action may, by written 
order, certify an order to the court of appeals for interlocutory review when the court believes 
that the order involves "a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for 
difference of opinion" and that "an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the 
ultimate tennination of the litigation." Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § Sl.OI4(d)(1)-
(2). Because the requirements for certifying an interlocutory order for appeal are identical to 
those under 28 U.S.c. § 1292(b), the case law interpreting Section 1292 is instructive. 
Here, Go Daddy requests that the Court certify for interlocutory review the Order because 
there are controlling questions of law, substantial differences of opinion exist, and an immediate 
appeal would advance the disposition ofthis litigation. 
A. A Controlling Issue of Law Exists 
A question constitutes a "controlling issue of law" if resolution of the question could 
determine the outcome or future course of the litigation. See Judicial Watch. Inc. v. National 
Energy Policy Dev. Group, 233 F.Supp.2d 16, 19 (D.D.C. 2002) (citing Johnson v. Burken, 930 
F.2d 1202, 1206 (7th Cir. 1991) (a question is controlling if "interlocutory reversal might save 
time for the district court and time and expense for the litigants"). 
Here, the issues proposed for certification - whether Plaintiffs have alleged facts that, if 
true, state a cause of action under Texas law and whether the immunity under Section 230 of the 
CDA bars any of those claims - are controlling issues of law. 
A motion to dismiss under Rule 91a by its very nature challenges the sufficiency of the 
claims asserted by Plaintiffs as a matter oflaw. Under Rule 91a, the Court must accept all well 
pleaded facts as true. The Court then determines whether those facts are sufficient to state a 
claim and whether a defense exists that would otherwise bar such a claim. 
Here, Go Daddy filed a motion to dismiss the claims asserted against it by AMP AS under 
two theories: (1) Plaintiffs failed to state facts sufficient to support its intentional tort and gross 
negligence claims against Go Daddy as a matter of law; and (2) even if such claim were 
sufficiently stated, Go Daddy enjoys statutory immunity under Section 230 of the CDA as a 
result of Plaintiffs' admissions in its pleadings that Go Daddy merely provided hosting services 
and did not create, develop, or publish the allegedly offending content at issue. The Court 
denied Go Daddy's motion. A reversal of the Order would result in the final determination of 
Plaintiffs' claims against Go Daddy. As a result, an interlocutory review of the Order will save 
the Court, Go Daddy, and Plaintiffs the time and expense of finiher litigating these issues. Thus, 
controlling issues oflaw exist that render the Order appropriate for interlocutory review. 
S. A Substantial Ground for Differences of Opinion Exists 
The existence of contrary, inconsistent, or unclear authority constitutes a "difference of 
opinion," warranting interlocutory review. See, e.g., APCC Servs. v. Sprint Commc'ns Co., 297 
F.Supp.2d 90, 97-98 (D.D.C. 2003), rev'd on other grounds, 418 F.3d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 2005), 
cert. granted and judgment vacated. 127 S. Ct. 2094 (2007). Certification of interlocutory 
review is appropriate even in the absence of difference of opinions, where "the case law is 
confused." Johnson v. Washington Area Transit Auth., 790 F. Supp. 1174, 1180 (D.D.C. 1991) 
(certifying interlocutory review on district court's decision issued on remand). 
Because of the infancy of Rule 91a, there are no published Texas authorities regarding its 
interpretation and application. Go Daddy filed its motion to dismiss under rule 91a one week 
after it became effective. Thus, the absence of authority relating to Rule 91 a is enough in and of 
itself to certify the Order for interlocutory review. 
The law in Texas, however, is also unsettled regarding whether, when, and to which type 
of claims CDA immunity under Section 230 applies. The only state appellate decision that has 
confronted the issue of CDA immunity did not reach a decision regarding whether intentional 
tort claims under Texas law are barred by such immunity. 1 See Milo v. Martin, 311 S.W.3d 210, 
215 (2010) C'[W]e find no reported Texas opinion that has addressed whether section 230 
preempts Texas defamation law relating to situations involving internet service providers who 
provide access to defamatory third-party created content."). In affirming the trial court's 
granting of a no-evidence motion, the Court expressly stated that while such a claim may 
"arguably not [be] within the reach of the Communications Decency Act of 1996" or its 
immunity to Internet service providers under Section 230, whether "an intentional infliction 
claim is available as a remedy [is] a matter we need not decide." ld. at 217. Moreover, unlike in 
this case where Plaintiffs assert seven intentional tort and two gross negligence claims, Milo 
dealt with a single claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. ld. at 215. 
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas also addressed the CDA, but only in the 
context of whether it completely preempted all state law. Recognizing that the immunity did not apply to those 
responsible for creating or developing content, the court held, consistent with authorities throughout the United 
States, that the CDA did not completely preempt all state law claims. See Cisneros v. Sanchez, 403 F.Supp.2d 588, 
593 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (remanding case removed by defendant on claim of federal preemption). The court did not, 
however, identify which, if any, state law claims were beyond the reach of CDA immunity against a hosting 
provider such as Go Daddy or the circumstances in which such immunity would not apply under Texas law. 
Other courts that have addressed CDA immunity have held that any claim, intentional or 
otherwise, that seeks to treat the service provider as if it is the publisher of the offending content 
is barred by Section 230. See, e.g., Ben Ezra, Weinstein, and Co., Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 206 
F.3d 980, 984-85 (10th Cir.2000) ("47 U.S.C. § 230 creates a federal immunity to any state law 
cause of action that would hold computer service providers liable for information originating 
with a third party."); Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir.1997) ("By its plain 
language, § 230 creates a federal immunity to any cause of action that would make service 
providers liable for infonnation originating with a third-party user of the service."); Smith v. 
Intercosmos Media Group, Inc., No. Civ.A. 02-1964,2002 WL 31844907, at *5 (E.D. La. Dec. 
17, 2002) ('"[A]ny claim made by the plaintiffs for damages or injunctive relief with regard to 
either defamation and libel, or negligence and fault[], are precluded by the immunity afforded by 
Section 230(c)(I), and subject to dismissal."). Indeed, courts have applied Section 230 to the 
very claims at issue here: negligence,2 invasion of privacy,3 infliction of emotional distress,4 and 
injunctive relief. 5 
Plaintiffs have asserted seven intentional torts and two claims of gross negligence against 
Go Daddy based on Go Daddy's provision of Internet hosting services. Plaintiffs readily admit 
that Go Daddy did not create, develop, or publish the offending content at issue. Thus, whether 
CDA immunity would bar liability under Texas law for these nine claims is a matter of first 
See, e.g., Cara/ano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir. 2003); Ben Ezra, Weinstein & 
Co., 206 F.3d at 984-85; Zeran, 129 F.3d at 332; Doe, 783 So. 2d at 1013-17; Green, 318 F.3d at 468. 
See, e.g., Cora/ana, 339 F.3d at 1122; Barrett, 799 N.E.2d at 920; Roskowski v. Corvallis Police Officers' 
Ass'n, No. Civ. 03-474-AS, 2005 WL 555398 (D. Or. March 9,2005). 
4 See, e.g., Donato v. Moldow, 865 A.2d 711, 713 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2005); Jane Doe One v. Oliver, 755 A.2d 
1000, 1002 (Conn. Sup. Ct. 2000). 
Noah v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., 26 I F.Supp.2d 532, 540 (E.D. Va. 2003) ("[G]iven that the purpose of § 
230 is to shield service providers from legal responsibility for the statements of third parties, § 230 should not be 
read to pennit claims that request only injunctive relief."); Ben Ezra, Weinstein & Co. v. America Online, Inc., No. 
97-485 LH/LFG, 1999 WL 727402, at *3 (D.N.M. Mar. 1, 1999) ("[T]he Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief from the 
Defendants continued publication of inaccurate stock information. AOL is again entitled to Section 230 immunity 
and this claim will be dismissed as well."), off'd, 206 F.3d 980, 983-86 (lOth Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 824 
(2000). 
impression for the appellate courts thereby rendering it appropriate to certify the Order for 
interlocutory review. Indeed, the apparent conflict between the concerns expressed in dicta in 
Milo and the authorities throughout the United States provides a sufficient difference of opinion 
so as to warrant immediate appeal. 
C. Certification Would Materially Advance the Disposition of the Litigation. 
Interlocutory review constitutes material advancement of litigation where "[a]n 
immediate appeal would conserve judicial resources and spare the parties from possible needless 
expense." APCC Sen'S., 297 F.Supp.2d at 100. An immediate appeal in this case would 
materially advance the disposition of this litigation by resolving the key question of whether 
Plaintiffs may maintain their claims in this case against Go Daddy, and in tum, whether they may 
pursue their claims as a class action. In the event that the Court of Appeals determines that CDA 
immunity applies to any or all of Plaintiffs' claims or that Plaintiffs cannot otherwise state a 
claim under Texas law against Go Daddy based on the facts alleged, Plaintiffs would no longer 
be able to pursue those dismissed claims against Go Daddy individually or on behalf of a class. 
Indeed, given the authorities supporting the application of CDA immunity to Internet service 
providers in circumstances presented in this case, there is a good likelihood that interlocutory 
review would end the litigation as to Go Daddy for the hundreds or potentially thousands of 
women who are putative class members. 
An appellate determination of the viability of Plaintiffs' claims against Go Daddy at this 
juncture will enable Plaintiffs, and putative class members, to determine whether they can 
proceed with their claims against Go Daddy at all or whether the case will be limited to the 
individuals responsible for creating, developing, and publishing the allegedly offending content. 
In the event that interlocutory review is not granted in this case, the parties would be forced to 
litigate the claims against Go Daddy, including unique issues such as Plaintiffs' claim that 
Section 230 immunity applies only if the speech at issue is protected by the First Amendment. 
Certifying an interlocutory appeal as requested will conserve both the parties' and the Court's 
resources, and obviate the possibility of expensive and time-consuming duplicative proceedings. 
See Phillip Morris, 2004 WL 1514215 at *3 (citing APCC Servs., 297 F.Supp.2d 90, 100). 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Go Daddy respectfully requests that this Court certify its Order 
for interlocutory review pursuant to Rule 168 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 
51.014(d) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code on the questions of whether: (1) 
whether immunity under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act bars each of the 
claims asserted against Go Daddy as a matter of law; and (2) whether Plaintiffs have alleged 
facts that, if true, state a claim under against Go Daddy as a matter of law. Go Daddy further 
requests that the Court amend its Order to state the conditions necessary for interlocutory review 
have been met. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
ORANGE COUNTY, TEXAS 
260TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
AMENDED ORDER 
Having considered GoDaddy.com, LLC's ("Go Daddy") request for certification and 
amendment to this Court's April 17,2013 Order (the "Order") denying Go Daddy's Motion to 
Dismiss, and having reviewed the briefs and the law, this Court is of the opinion that the Order 
involves controlling questions of law as to which there are substantial grounds for difference of 
opinion. As such, an immediate appeal from the Order will materially advance the ultimate 
termination of this litigation. The Court therefore certifies the Order for immediate interlocutory 
appeal to the Texas Court of Appeals. Specifically, the Court certifies the following issues: (1) 
whether immunity under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (the "CDA") bars 
each of the claims asserted against Go Daddy as a matter oflaw based on Plaintiffs' admission 
that Go Daddy did not create, develop, or publish the content at issue; and (2) whether, as a 
matter oflaw, Plaintiffs have alleged facts that, if true, state a claim against Go Daddy. 
Buddie J. Hahn, Presiding Judge 
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